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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROYAL STREET LAND 
a Utah corporation 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
WILLIAM J. REED 
and PATSY REED, 
Defendant 
COMPANY, ) 
-Appellant, ) 
s-Respondents. ) 
No. 19480 
Royal Street Land Company, the plaintiff in the 
District Court and the appellant herein, respectfully submits 
this Reply Brief, by and through its counsel of record. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered by 
District Judge Homer Wilkinson of the Third Judicial District 
Court for Summit County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The Summary Judgment from which Royal Street appeals 
stems from rulings made by District Judge Homer Wilkinson upon 
a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of William J. 
Reed and Patsy Reed, defendants in the District Court and the 
respondents herein, which Motion, though previously denied, was 
purportedly renewed, and from rulings upon a Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by Royal Street. The said Summary Judgment 
granted the Reeds' renewed Motion and denied Royal Street's 
Motion. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
As noted in Royal Street's Opening Brief, Royal Street 
asks that this Court reverse the Summary Judgment appealed from < 
and direct that the District Court enter judgment against the 
Reeds and in favor of Royal Street. In the alternative, Royal 
Street asks that this Court remand this case to the District , 
Court for further proceedings. * 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Royal Street's Opening Brief contains an extensive 
"Statement of the Facts" presented to the District Court. 
(Opening Brief at 2-13). The "Statement of Facts" set forth at 
pages 2 through 8 of the Brief of Respondents (hereinafter 
sometimes "Reeds' Brief") largely reiterates those facts and, 
to that extent, requires no reply. 
Royal Street, does, however, take issue with the 
Reeds' "Statement of Facts" to the extent that it advances 
argument as "fact", as, for example, by asserting that "it was 
undisputed that the Reeds have paid all taxes . . . assessed 
against the property" (Reeds' Brief at 3), and to the extent 
that it advances as "fact" matters nowhere appearing in the 
record, as occurs, for example, in footnote 1 at page 6 of the 
Reeds' Brief. Royal Street relies upon the full "Statement of 
the Facts" set forth in its Opening Brief and submits that 
those facts are not in dispute. 
-2-
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
REEDS' RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND IN DENYING ROYAL STREETfS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT THE REEDS DID 
NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 
78-12-12 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (REPL. VOL. 9A 
1977) 
1. Neither the Payment by the Reeds or Their 
Predecessors of Taxes Assessed by Summit County 
on Buildings or Improvements Prior to 1973 or the 
Payment by the Reeds of Taxes Assessed by Summit 
County from 1973 Through 1978 Satisfy the 
Requirements of Section 78-12-12 
At pages 16 and 17 of Royal Street's Opening Brief, 
Royal Street urged that the payment by the Reeds or their 
predecessors of taxes assessed by Summit County did not satisfy 
the requirements of Section 78-12-12 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. 
Vol. 9A 1977) because Section 78-12-12 requires that the taxes 
paid to acquire title by adverse possession be taxes on "land" 
and because the pre-1973 taxes which were paid by the Reeds or 
their predecessors were taxes on buildings or improvements, not 
on "land". At pages 17 through 19 of Royal Street's Opening 
Brief, Royal Street also urged that the payment by the Reeds of 
taxes assessed by Summit County from 1973 through 1978 also did 
not satisfy the requirements of Section 78-12-12 because, among 
other things, such post-1973 taxes, though assessed upon a real 
property description, were not paid for a full seven (7) years 
before this action was commenced and were paid on a real 
-3-
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property description which did not, in fact, describe the real 
property to which the Reeds claim title by adverse possession. 
The Reeds' Brief essentially concedes the force of 
Royal Street's arguments as to the pre-1973 and post-1973 
Summit County taxes paid by the Reeds or their predecessors. 
Rather than directly oppose Royal Street's arguments, the Reeds 
assert that the payment of Summit County taxes by themselves or 
their predecessors is "irrelevant" to the Reeds' claim of title 
by adverse possession. (Reeds' Brief at 11-13). In this 
regard, the Reeds assert that they or their predecessors paid 
all of the taxes assessed by Summit County and that if those 
taxes were not taxes upon the surface estate of the "land" or 
real property in issue, they nonetheless can acquire title by 
adverse possession because no taxes were assessed upon the 
surface estate of that real property. (Id. at 10). 
2. The Taxes Assessed by the State Tax Commission 
and Paid by Royal Street or Its Predecessors 
Included the Surface Estate in the Real Property 
in Issue and, Since the Reeds Did Not Pay Any Of 
Those Taxes, They Cannot Acquire Title by Adverse 
Possession 
Given the Reeds' position as to the Summit County 
taxes as expressed in the Reeds' Brief, Royal Street agrees 
with the Reeds that the question of whether the Reeds have 
satisfied the requirements of Section 78-12-12 turns upon 
whether the taxes assessed by the State Tax Commission on 
"mines and mining claims" pursuant to Section 59-5-57 Utah Code 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Annotated (Repl. Vol. 6B 1974) included the surface estate. 
(E.g. Reeds? Brief at 3). If such taxes included the surface 
estate, the Reeds clearly cannot acquire title by adverse 
possession since Royal Street or its predecessors, and not the 
Reeds, admittedly paid all such taxes. 
Royal Street submits that it is absolutely clear that 
the taxes assessed by the State Tax Commission and paid by 
Royal Street or its predecessors did include the surface 
estate in the real property in issue. There is no dispute but 
that between at least 1939 and through 1977 taxes were assessed 
by the State Tax Commission "for both the surface and mineral 
rights of the Goodell, Olive Branch, and Trump Millsitesff, of 
which the real property in issue is a part. (R. 120 and 
122-124; emphasis supplied). This fact, which the Reeds' Brief 
conveniently ignores, is itself dispositive of this appeal. 
The Reeds? contention that the mere use of "the 
surface . . . for non-mining purposes . . . requires separate 
assessments of the surface and mineral estates, and [requires 
the application of] the mining claim tax only to the underlying 
mineral rights" is both unfounded and incorrect. The State 
Tax Commission assessed "both the surface and mineral rights" 
despite the ReedsT use of the surface and such was entirely in 
Reeds1 Brief at 9. 
-5-
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accordance with Section 59-5-57. 
As noted at pages 26 and 27 of Royal Street's Opening 
Brief, Section 59-5-57 grants the State Tax Commission the 
exclusive authority to tax "mining claims" so long as the 
surface and the mineral estate in the claims are in common 
ownership; it is only where the surface "is used for other than 
mining purposes" and where the surface and the mineral estate 
are "owned" by different persons that county taxing entities 
are authorized to tax the surface. To credit the Reedsf 
contention that mere use of the surface by claimants to title, 
such as the Reeds, renders the "mining claims" tax a tax only 
on the mineral rights in the claims would be to ascribe a 
ridiculous intention to the Legislature. If the "mining 
claims" tax could be so rendered a tax only on the mineral 
rights and if both the surface and the mineral estate in the 
claims were in common ownership, as was the case here, n<o 
taxing entity could tax the surface estate. This plainly was 
not the Legislature's intention. The Legislature's intention 
was, rather, that the "mining claims" tax include both the 
surface and the mineral estate. See Mammouth Mining Co. v. 
Juab County, 10 Utah 232, 236, 37 P. 348 (1894): 
"[T]he Supreme Court of the United States defines 
a mining claim 'as a parcel of land containing 
precious metal in its soil or rock.' Such parcel 
of land extends by common law principles usque ad 
coelum in one direction, and usque ad orcum in 
-6-
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the other." Accord: Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 
U.S. 636, 649 (1881); Morse v. DeAdrio, 107 Cal. 
622, 40 P. 1018, 1019 (1895); Cochrane v. Justice 
Mining Co., 4 Colo. App. 234, 35 P. 752, 754 
(1894). 
The Reeds1 further contentions regarding taxes on 
2 
surface uses are entirely beside the point. Taxes upon 
surface uses, as opposed to the surface estate, would not, 
even if assessed, be taxes on "land", which are the only taxes 
pertinent insofar as adverse possession is concerned. (See 
Royal Street's Opening Brief at 28, n. 7). The Reeds could not 
acquire title by adverse possession by paying taxes upon 
surface uses any more than could acquire title by paying taxes 
on buildings and improvements, which taxes are concededly 
"irrelevant". 
Neither Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 
P. 1119 (1914) or Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 165, 152 
P. 178 (1915) upon which the Reeds' rely decided the 
question of whether the "mining claims" tax includes both the 
surface estate and the mineral estate. As Royal Street noted 
at pages 20 through 23 and 28 through 31 of its Opening Brief, 
Chandler was decided upon a set of agreed facts which included 
an agreement that the State taxes assessed to and paid by the 
plaintiff were "separate and distinct" from and "cumulative" to 
E.g. Reeds' Brief at 14. 
Reeds' Brief at 16-21. 
-7-
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the taxes paid by the defendants. This Court was not called 
upon to consider any contention that the State assessed tax was 
a tax on the surface estate which would preclude the plaintiff 
from acquiring title by adverse possession and, accordingly, no 
such determination was "essential to [the] ruling in Chandler" 
as the Reeds contend. (Reeds' Brief at 18). As Royal Street 
noted at pages 23 through 25 and 28 through 31 of its Opening 
Brief, Eckman was remanded for a determination as to whether 
both the surface and the mineral estate of the mining claim had 
been assessed by the State. That point is, of course, clear 
here. Royal Street or its predecessors were assessed upon 
"both the surface and mineral rights" in the real property in 
issue. As explained at pages 29 through 32 of Royal Street's 
Opening Brief, Justice Wolfe's opinions in Telonis v. Staley, 
104 Utah 505, 106 P.2d 163 (194), overruled, 104 Utah 537, 144 
P.2d 513 (1943) and Aggellos v. Zella Mining Co., 99 Utah 417, 
107 P.2d 170 (1940) indicate that Chandler and Eckman do not 
and should not be read in the manner urged by the Reeds. 
The Reeds attempt to fault Royal Street's analogy to 
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co. v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 35 Utah 528, 
10 P. 586 (1909) is predicated upon the Reeds mistaken 
contention that mere use of the surface estate by an adverse 
claimant converts the "mining claims" tax from a tax on both 
the surface and the mineral estate to a tax on only the mineral 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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estate. (Reeds1 Brief at 22-23). When read in light of 
Section 59-5-57, as properly construed, the conclusion in Rio 
Grande is closely analogous to that urged by Royal Street. 
(Royal Street's Opening Brief at 31-34). 
4 
In answer to the Reeds1 "public policy" argument, 
it will suffice to note that the public policy of this State as 
regards adverse possession is established by statute. Title by 
adverse possession can be acquired only in accordance with 
statute. As Section 78-12-12 requires that the Reeds have paid 
all taxes assessed against the surface estate in the real 
property in issue and since Royal Street or its predecessors, 
and not the Reeds, paid the taxes so assessed by the State Tax 
Commission, the Reeds cannot acquire title by adverse 
possession. 
B. SECTION 78-12-5 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(REPL. VOL. 9A 1977) DOES NOT BAR ROYAL 
STREETfS ACTION 
Royal Street's action is not barred by Section 78-12-5 
Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977) for reasons fully 
explained at pages 34 through 40 of Royal Street's Opening 
Brief. The Reeds' argument that the action is so barred is 
advanced without the benefit of any legal authority and, 
Reeds' Brief at 23-24. 
Reeds' Brief at 24-30. 
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i 
i 
therefore, not surprisingly fails to come to terms with the 
fact that this Court and the Legislature have given the statute 
precisely the effect urged by Royal Street,
 ( 
Section 78-12-5 is not a statute of limitations in the 
usual sense. It is not intended to bar an action against a 
person who has not acquired title by adverse possession because 
it is a fundamental precept of the law of real property that a 
party claiming title by adverse possession must establish title 
in itself and cannot merely assert defects in its opponent's 
title. See, e.g. Homeowners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 
208, 220, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (1943). Indeed, if Section 78-12-5 
were interpreted to bar an action against a person who has not 
acquired title by adverse possession, it would serve to promote 
only confusion as to titles. The record owner, in that 
situation, would have title, but no means to acquire possession 
and the adverse party would have possession, but no hope of 
title. Such a result and the interpretation of the words 
"possessed adversely" appearing in Section 78-12-7 Utah Code 
Annotated (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977) argued for by the Reeds would 
run directly contrary to this Court's decisions. See, e.g., 
Keller v. Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 545, 133 P.2d 318, 323 
(1943) (ten years' possession did not bar action where taxes 
paid for only a four year period before action commenced); 
Reeds' Brief at 27-29. 
-10-
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Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 231, 26 P. 291, 292-293 
(1891): 
"The statute does not, in effect, presume a 
grant and give the person relying upon it the 
title from seven years' possession alone. The 
presumption is made from the fact that the land 
is held adversely; and to make the holding 
adverse the land must have been protected by a 
substantial inclosure, or it must have been 
usually cultivated and improved, or labor or 
money must have been expended to irrigate it, 
amounting to the sum of five dollars per acre. 
And in either case the occupation and claim must 
have been continuous for the seven years and 
during that time the claimant, his predecessors 
or grantors, must have paid all taxes levied and 
assessed upon the land according to law." 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REJECTING 
CERTAIN OF ROYAL STREETfS OBJECTIONS TO THE 
FORM OF THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Royal Street's primary purpose in this appeal is to 
have this Court reverse the Summary Judgment appealed from and 
enter judgment in favor of Royal Street and against the Reeds. 
Royal Street's alternative request that this Court remand the 
case to the District Court urges that the District Court erred 
in rejecting certain of Royal Street's objections to the form 
of the Summary Judgment. This alternative request and the 
grounds therefor are discussed at pages 39 through 41 of Royal 
Street's Opening Brief. 
A. THE OBJECTION THAT THE REEDS FAILED TO SHOW 
THE PAYMENT OF ANY TAXES ON THE PROPERTY 
THAT THEY ACTUALLY CLAIMED 
Given the Reeds' position that the Summit County taxes 
are "irrelevant" to their claim of adverse possession, the fact 
-11-
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4 
< 
that the post-1973 taxes assessed to and paid by the Reeds were 
based upon a property description which did not describe the 
property that they actually claim loses some of its i 
significance. (Reeds' Brief at 30-31). It bears noting, 
however, that the Reeds do not now dispute that the post-1973 
assessments failed to describe the property that they actually \ 
claim and assert only that the assessments were based upon a 
legal description which the Reeds "intended" to describe that 
property. (Id. at 7). 
B. THE OBJECTION BASED UPON THE DEDICATION BY 
ROYAL STREET TO PARK CITY 
The Reeds1 arguments as to the timeliness of Royal 
Street's assertion, by objection to the form of Summary 
Judgment, that Royal Street had dedicated a portion of the 
property actually claimed by the Reeds to Park City in 1979, 
of course, ignore the fact that objections urging that a 
nonparty must be joined in order for certain relief to be 
awarded can be raised at any time. (See Rule 12 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure). Moreover, the objection was raised 
as soon as practicable after the correct legal description of 
the real property actually claimed by the Reeds was ascertained. 
It is no answer to Royal Street's objection that the 
Reeds claim to have acquired title by adverse possession before 
Reeds' Brief at 31-32. 
-1?-
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the dedication, as it is precisely the need for such 
determinations, which follows from the property description 
employed in the Summary Judgment entered by the District Court, 
that renders Park City an indispensible party. At the very 
least, the District Court should have afforded an opportunity 
for hearing on this objection. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in Royal 
Street's Opening Brief, the Summary Judgment appealed from must 
be reversed and the District Court must be directed to enter 
judgment against the Reeds and in favor of Royal Street. In 
the alternative, this Court should remand this case to the 
District Court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 1984. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
M. Scott Woodland 
Samuel 0. Gaufin 
By A^niLi.-. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Royal Street Land Company 
Id. at 33. 
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